Authentication vs. Encryption
• an secret-key encryption scheme uses a secret key K to transform a plaintext x into a ciphertext y
• the same key can be used to decrypt y, thereby obtaining x
• without knowledge of K, it should be infeasible to compute x from y
• a message authentication code (or, MAC) uses a secret key K to compute an authentication tag a for a plaintext x
• the message (x, a) is transmitted to a recipient who also knows the value of K
• knowledge of K allows the tag to be verified
• if an adversary, who does not know the value of K, creates a bogus new message (x ′ , a ′ ), then (with high probability) the tag a 
Motivating Scenario
• chaffing-and-winnowing was suggested by Ron Rivest
• suppose that encryption schemes are outlawed, while message authentication codes remain legal
• the basic idea is to use a MAC to provide confidentiality
• a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob) share a secret key K
• Alice prepares a number of messages and sends them to Bob
• each message has the form m = (x, a), where each x is a plaintext and a is an authentication tag
• Bob only accepts the message(s) having authentication tags that are valid under the key K
• a bad guy has no way to distinguish between valid and invalid authentication tags, so confidentiality is achieved
• Hanaoka et al. first studied chaffing-and-winnowing schemes in the setting of unconditional security (which is also known as information-theoretic security )
• they make use of authentication codes that are unconditionally secure against impersonation
• in their construction, the entropy of the authentication tag is the same as the entropy of the plaintext
• this means that a tag (by itself, without any plaintext) already can provide perfect secrecy
• we construct unconditionally secure chaffing-and-winnowing schemes with short (i.e., 1-bit) authentication tags June 2, 2007 Unconditionally Secure Chaffing-and-Winnowing Scheme
An unconditionally secure chaffing-and-winnowing scheme is a 5-tuple (X , A, K, E, F) is a chaffing-and-winnowing scheme.
• X = {0, . . . , n − 1} is the set of plaintexts ,
• A is a set of authentication tags ,
• K is a set of decryption keys ,
• for any K ∈ K and any x ∈ X , there is a set E(K, x) of encryption functions . For each e ∈ E(K, x), e : X → A.
• E = K∈K,x∈X E(K, x)
• F = {f K : K ∈ K} is a set of authentication functions , where
The Protocol Suppose (X , A, K, E, F) is a chaffing-and-winnowing scheme.
Step 1. A decryption key K ∈ K is chosen randomly by Alice and communicated to the receiver, Bob, over a secure channel.
Step 2. Later, Alice wants to encrypt a plaintext x ∈ X = {0, . . . , n − 1} to send to Bob. Alice chooses an encryption function e ∈ E(K, x) uniformly at random. Then Alice computes a j = e(j) for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. The list of n ordered pairs,
is sent to Bob; y is the ciphertext .
Step 3. Bob computes
Bob decrypts y to the plaintext x if and only if {j : b j = a j } = {x}. (There must be exactly one ordered pair m = (x, a) such that a is a valid authentication tag under the key K. The plaintext element x is the decryption of y.)
Perfect Secrecy
• in the setting of unconditional security, confidentiality means "perfect secrecy" as defined by Shannon
• a chaffing-and-winnowing scheme is said to provide perfect secrecy
for all plaintexts x and all ciphertexts y
• that is, the a priori probability of plaintext x is the same as the a posteriori probability of x given that the ciphertext y is observed.
• we assume that Pr[x] > 0 for all x, so we can apply Bayes' Theorem, which states that
• it is easily seen that we have perfect secrecy if and only if Pr[y|x] = Pr[y] for all plaintexts x and all ciphertexts y.
Example (Hanaoka et al.) We describe a special case of the scheme of Hanaoka et al. Suppose that X = A = {0, . . . , n − 1}, K = {K 0 , . . . , K n−1 } and f K i (j) = j − i mod n for all i and j.
For any i, x, there is one function in E(K i , x), namely, e i,x , where
Then it is easy to see that a ciphertext has the form
We illustrate with the case n = 4. First we present the four decryption functions and then we present the encryption function in each E(K i , x). All encryption and decryption functions are written as 4-tuples.
Example (cont.)
0 (0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 1) (2, 2, 2, 2) (3, 3, 3, 3) 1 (3, 3, 3, 3) (0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 1) (2, 2, 2, 2) 2 (2, 2, 2, 2) (3, 3, 3, 3) (0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 1) 3 (1, 1, 1, 1) (2, 2, 2, 2) (3, 3, 3, 3) (0, 0, 0, 0)
Suppose K = K 2 = (2, 3, 0, 1) and x = 1.
The ciphertext is y = ((0, 3), (1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 3)).
To decrypt y, compare K and the list of authenticators in y.
(2, 3, 0, 1) and (3, 3, 3, 3) agree in the second co-ordinate, so x = 1.
Critique
• this chaffing-and-winnowing scheme provides perfect secrecy
• a ciphertext consists of a list of all possible plaintexts, each one having the same authentication tag,
• it is clearly sufficient to transmit just the tag, since all the other information is redundant
• however, the tag, by itself, provides perfect secrecy: it can be uniquely decrypted by the recipient of the message, but no adversary has any information about the value of the plaintext
• that is, the underlying authentication scheme already provides perfect secrecy and hence it can be viewed as an encryption scheme A New Scheme Based on 1-bit Authenticators
Suppose that X = {0, . . . , n − 1}, A = {0, 1}, K = {0, 1} n and f K (j) = κ j mod n for all K = (κ 0 , . . . , κ n−1 ) and all j.
For any K, x, there is one function in E(K, x), namely, e K,x , where
The authentication function f K and the encryption function e K,x are "complements" of each other, except for the input x, where they agree.
An Improvement
• suppose we restrict the set of decryption keys to be
• we reduce the number of decryption keys by a factor of two by only using keys with even hamming weight
• this modified scheme is denoted CW E (n)
Theorem 1
For any integer k ≥ 1, the scheme CW E (2 k ) is an unconditionally secure chaffing-and-winnowing scheme for k-bit plaintexts, based on 1-bit authenticators, in which a decryption key consists of 2 k − 1 bits and a ciphertext consists of 2 k bits.
Example
In the case n = 4, we present the sets E E (K, x) in the scheme (X , A, K E , E E , F): 
Theorem 3
Suppose (X , A, K, E, F) is any chaffing-and-winnowing scheme in which |X | = n and |A| = 2. Then K must consist of all the binary n-tuples of even weight, all the binary n-tuples of odd weight, or all the binary n-tuples.
Corollary 4
Suppose (X , A, K, E, F) is any chaffing-and-winnowing scheme in which |X | = n and |A| = 2. Then |K| ≥ 2 n−1 .
A Hybrid Scheme
Suppose we have an ℓ-bit plaintext, where ℓ = rk, and we break it into r blocks, each of which contains k bits. Each k-bit block is then encrypted using a scheme CW E (2 k ). In total, we have r independent schemes CW E (2 k ), each of which has an independently chosen key. Each possible ℓ-bit plaintext receives an r-bit authenticator, which is the concatenation of the 1-bit authenticators of each of the r blocks in the plaintext. This hybrid scheme, which will be denoted by HCW(r, k), has the following properties.
Theorem 5
For integers k, r ≥ 1, the scheme HCW(r, k) is an unconditionally secure chaffing-and-winnowing scheme for rk-bit plaintexts, based on r-bit authenticators, in which a decryption key consists of r(2 k − 1) bits and a ciphertext consists of r 2 k bits.
